INTRODUCTION
The current significance of this topic is not in doubt. First, the world-wide prevalence of ethnic diversity is indicated by the presence of about 6000 languages (Grimes 1988) Over the past quarter-century scholars have paid rapidly increasing (even if belated) attention to these remarkable phenomena. Ethnopolitics, including nationalistic developments, is a crucial global force (cf Ragin 1983:1317, Moynihan 1993). Prior reviews of research on ethnicity have attributed this growing interest to the near-universality of multiethnic states, the persistence of strong ethnies in complex modern societies, ideological and policy disagreements, and the prevalence of severe ethnic conflicts (Olzak 1983 , Yinger 1985 . Meanwhile, at long last, military strategists are paying close attention to terrorism (Gibbs 1989) and so-called low-intensity conflicts, which often are ethnically based (cf Schultz 1991 , Hoffman 1992 .
Because it has become quite impossible in this field to "review all the literature," this chapter has been forced to omit the enormous assemblage of data and interpretations dealing with religious fundamentalism, e.g. the six volumes emerging from The Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (cf Marty & Appleby 1993a,b). Similarly we give only passing mention to many important historical studies of particular soci-eties (e.g. Suny 1985 ). Prior reviews make it possible to omit a survey of recent literature on ethnicity in the United States: Williams (1975 Williams ( , 1977 Williams ( , 1978 Our survey is illustrative rather than comprehensive. The central problem is how and under what circumstances interactions among ethnic collectivities produce strong oppositions and overt conflicts (Rule 1988:9-10 ). Much of the relevant research has been done by nonsociologists; we happily include that work wherever the content is suitably sociological.
Before entering upon the main task, however, we must briefly set the review in a world-context and then examine the central concepts that are essential for the later discussion.
THE WORLD CONTEXT
In the last decade of this century, the world is increasingly interdependent, economically, politically, culturally. Transnational and international organizations have become more and more important. Meanwhile national states multiply, armaments increase to unprecedented levels, and political instability is endemic. At the same time, economic inequalities among countries are great and are increasing. Ethnic, religious, and class oppositions place severe stresses on weak states. The heritage of the great wave of decolonization through the 1960s (Boswell 1989 , Strang 1990 ) was a new population of multiethnic states, racked by domestic conflict.
A heavily armed and politically unstable universe of sovereign states regularly produces some 30 or more wars per year. As of 1992 about 40 violent collective conflicts were being fought in 29 countries (Hoffman 1992:26) .
Ethnic conflicts since World War II have been facilitated by the rise in the number of new multiethnic states, by state-building activities, increased resources for mobilization, mass communication, diffusion of ideologies-and by external interventions. These developments have helped to instigate ethnic conflicts over control of central polities, conflicts over cross-national claims to territory, and struggles over autonomy or secession (Nagel 1980:280-82 ). The primary conditions thus are ethnic distinctiveness, geographic concentration, interethnic inequality, "alien" state penetration (and fear of exclusion), ethnic organization, and external support.
Ethnic divisions and ethnic-state relations are created, accentuated, reduced, or destroyed by the increasing internationalization of political economies, both in the division of labor and in the internationalization of state security (Enloe 1980 (Enloe , 1986 .
Rapid population growth characterizes the less-industrialized world regions
where there is great poverty and economic inequality within fragile states. World-wide increases in highly destructive weaponry accompany extensive militarization. And the (partial) end of the Cold War has created new international uncertainties and has released many formerly suppressed domestic conflicts.
The enormous flows of international migrants continually reshape ethnic relations. The United Nations estimates that in 1993 as many as 100 million individuals live outside their country of birth or citizenship; as many as 18 million are refugees. Numerous guest-workers and other migrating workers elicit tensions and some violence in many places, e.g. Germany, France, the United States. (We note that Frankfurt is the third largest Turkish city, behind Istanbul and Ankara.)
The structure of intrasocietal cleavages and the history of relationships among social formations-ethnies, classes, regions-constitute a global context of constraints upon and opportunities for collective action. Within such contexts, purposive actions by ethnic entrepreneurs and political leaders influence subsequent events, leading toward or away from ethnic conflict. Accordingly, a major dimension of ethnic conflict or cooperation, world-wide, is the relation of ethnies to territorial states that claim unitary sovereignty over a territory and its population.
CONCEPTS AND THEORIES
Problems of definitions just will not go away, so controversies continue regarding how best to characterize such terms as ethny, ethnic group, competition, rivalry, conflict, solidarity, mobilization, nation, nationalism, state. Many of these terms have been defined and discussed in prior volumes of the Annual Review of Sociology, e.g. Williams 1975 , Hirschman 1983 , Olzak 1983 , Yinger 1985 . Accordingly, this chapter treats only the most salient recent discussions.
Structural Units
The awkward and potentially misleading term "ethnic group" is so deeply entrenched in the professional literature that it may be folly to resist it. Yet there is the better word, "ethny," proposed by van den Berghe (1981:22, cf Dutter 1990) and used routinely by AD Smith (1981); we shall use it here whenever convenient. The term captures the core idea: "The prototypical ethny is ... a descent group bounded socially by inbreeding and spatially by territory" (van den Berghe 1981:24). From this core, more extended ethnies develop by preferential endogamy, extended nepotism, fictive kinship, descent myths, and extension into large territories. At one extreme is the small, cohesive, closed local ethny; at the other, the vastly extended "symbolic" boundaries of modem ethnic identities (Yinger 1985:161 How is ethnicity related to "nation" and "nationality"? A useful characterization: "A nation (but see Gellner 1983) is a politically conscious ethny, claiming statehood rights on the basis of common ethnicity" (van den Berghe 1983:222, cf Smith 1989:342). Nationalism is an ideological movement in support of a nation. Note, however, that the term "nationalism" is used to refer to two quite different conceptions: (i) identification with and loyalty to the state structure, regardless of ethnic composition of the population (American, Argentinian); (ii) identification with and loyalty to an ethnic/religious "nationality" that may or may not coincide with a state's jurisdiction (Scottish, Breton, Tamil) (Connor 1981:201 Conflict of course, has been given numerous definitions-psychological, cultural, and social. Social conflict was defined some decades ago as "a struggle over values (distributive or nondistributive) in which the immediate aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals" (Williams 1947: 43) .
This characterization points to a general area of interest. For particular research purposes, however, it is necessary to identify a complex range of more specific phenomena. The main forms of collective ethnic conflict are (i) turmoil (strikes, demonstrations, mutinies (Rose 1982 A tendency among theorists in this field is to focus upon a single factor or set of conditions and to ignore, downplay, or reject others. So, it is said, the primary factor in ethnic conflict is resource mobilization, or competition, or state actions, or internal colonialism, or economic inequalities, or labor market segmentation, or ethnic inequalities, or social strains and anomie-and so on. Assertions that many modem ethnies are artificially created, fabricated, instrumentally formed, or imagined are mostly irrelevant for the conclusions to be drawn from ethnic revivals and upsurges. The intense passions manifest in modern cases of ethnogenesis make pointless the constructionist skepticism: the solidarities clearly do exist and are accompanied by strong sentiments and collective actions (cf Fishman 1981:239). It is striking testimony that a work entitled Creating Ethnicity reaches this conclusion:
Ethnic groups and their cultures are not merely a completely arbitrary construct: there is always a minimum of incontestable and noninterpretable facts necessary to win something from the opponent. ...The reality is very elastic but not totally arbitrary. (Roosens 1989:156) Of course, there are social identities and formations below ethnies, e.g., families, lineages, villages, clans, and there are identities above the ethnies, e.g. religious organizations, regions, states, interstate organizations, transnational organizations and social movements. Ethnicity is not everything, but its place in social conflict can now be well defined.
THE STAKES IN ETHNIC OPPOSITIONS

Grievances and Objects of Contention
The notion of grievance is often conflated with related concepts of dissatisfaction or deprivation. But to say "grievance" is to say that someone is aggrieved, not merely deprived, disappointed, frustrated, or dissatisfied. A grievance is "a wrong considered as grounds for complaint" (Random House Dictionary of the English Language)-that is, a claim is made that an injustice has occurred. Just as a claim is a socially legitimated demand, not just a desire or want, so a grievance is a normative protest, not just a dissatisfaction. The conceptual distinction has deep social roots. The special intensity so evident in many ethnic conflicts frequently arises from a sense of victimization (Zaslavsky 1992) arising from loss of autonomy, loss of historically claimed territory, infringement of prior rights, or generally, treatment thought to be unfairly discriminatory (Harris 1977). These considerations suggest a specific hypothesis: The likelihood of conflict is higher when disagreement and opposition concern collective goods, e.g. language rights, religious beliefs and symbols, civil and political rights and privileges, regional-ethnic power, or regional-ethnic parity in the economy. The more nearly indivisible the goods and the less the access of the "disadvantaged," the greater is the resentment and the more likely is ethnic mobilization, followed by overt conflict (see Fraser et al 1990).
Conflict is favored when there is interethnic rivalry and at the same time the ethnies have low positive interdependence (complementarity), are unequal in socioeconomic status, and when the subordinated ethny perceives the superordinate collectivity as violating norms of fairness (Belanger & Pinard 1991). Anything that greatly increases ethnic salience is likely to produce increased attention to collective goods and-given ethnic inequality-to increased apprehension of discrimination. What then generates perceptions of unfairness is competition/rivalry when an ethny is subordinated or disadvantaged in economic opportunity, social status, political voice and rights, or cultural expression. These conditions stimulate grievances that acquire a tincture of moral outrage (cf Belanger & Pinard 1991:449).
Control of Territory
Some of the intractable ethnic conflicts of recent years have involved disputed claims to land: "territory" has not lost its significance as an object of contention (cf Kamen 1991). Many ethnoregional conflicts are directed against the state in efforts to gain or restore control over a homeland: as in Quebec, Scotland, southern Sudan, Eritrea, Tamil Evidently sociological analysis needs to consider ideological factors. "National self-determination" or "self-determination of peoples" is a variant of doctrines of popular sovereignty. If sovereignty of a state rests upon the will of the people it claims to encompass, then the legitimacy of states can be challenged by the claims of subnationalities. If at the same time it is claimed that sovereignty is absolute, so that states treat as illegitimate all external humanitarian efforts or human rights interventions, then ethnic issues can become crucial not only for regime and government stability but also for state autonomy and international relations. That "foreign" rule is illegitimate is indeed an explosive idea in a world of multiethnic national states (cf Connor 1990 Connor , 1992 .
In the crucial test-case of genocide, the conspicuous failures of the United Nations to intervene have been analyzed in detail by Kuper (1985) . Not only do heads of states fear intervention elsewhere as a precedent that may later be used against them, but reluctance may be heightened also by the circumstance that political mass killing has been a means to power on the part of many governments represented in the United Nations (Kuper 1985:128). Under conditions of extreme scarcity, informal economies develop-smuggling, black markets, hoarding, diversion of resources from the public arena, official collusion. Such parallel systems tend to cohere around ethnic and regional social networks. One result is a sharpening of ethnic boundarieswithin a class system shaped by the state (Chazan 1986:142-43) .
SOURCES OF OPPOSITION AND CONFLICT: HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS
Introduction
The respective parts played by class and ethnic factors in political oppositions can change through time. In the Quebec independence movement, early class differences were marked: lowest support among managers and proprietors, farmers and workers; higher among the highly educated and intellectual strata. Over time, support increased in all classes, but the intelligentsia continued to lead. These findings are consistent with evidence for the high importance of the intelligentsia in nationalistic movements in countries as different as Nigeria, France (Brittany), Spain (Basques), and Trinidad (Pinard & Hamilton 1984) .
Ethnic activists include a high proportion of intellectuals-school teachers, mass media people, writers, publicists. They recently have been upwardly mobile. They are articulate and ambitious and at the same time often occupied with a search for identity (cf Beer 1980).
In the well-studied case of Belgium, ethnic opposition was preceded by struggles that were first defined in religious terms and then as class conflicts. In each period, the political solutions were constitutional, but the resulting arrangements were subsequently objects of ethnic confrontation. Analysis by Covell (1985: see Brass, ed.) suggested once more that it is when class and ideological or religious differences coincide with ethnic cleavages that the most severe conflicts will appear (Covell 1985:256-57) .
In a skeptical review of research on political protest, Zimmerman (1980:77) was willing to say that if there is one basic finding, it is that economically developed societies have less intense forms of political violence. It happens, of course, that the economically developed societies differ from others in many other potentially decisive ways, especially in the structure of political opportunities.
Ethnoregional studies offer puzzles. Recall that Beissinger (1992) presented data for the Soviet Union showing greatest violence in poorer and less urbanized regions. But Beer's major work on ethnic activism in France (1980) reported that extra-electoral dissent was higher in the economically less developed areas, whereas ethnic electoral political activity is more typical of "developed" regions. Horowitz (1985: chapter 6) developed the distinction between "backwardness" (disadvantage) of ethnies and of the region of concentrated residence. His inventory of diverse cases shows that secessionistic movements tend to be frequent and early for backward groups in backward regions, somewhat frequent but late for advanced groups in backward regions, rare but early for backward groups in advanced regions, and, finally, rare and late for advanced collectivities in advantaged regions (Horowitz 1985:258). The movement toward an integrated European economy increasingly raises broader questions concerning immigration, labor mobility, ethnicity, and citizenship. National states still claiming sovereignty face increasing ethnic conflict (Miles 1992) . A typical response of national states is to impose restrictions on immigration.
Special threats and opportunities help to explain such cases as Basques and Catalans in Spain and
Very large international movements of population are increasingly volatile and unpredictable, and both economic inequalities and violent conflicts generate great pressures for migration (Teitelbaum 1992 ). Accordingly, the likely prospects are for continuing ethnic tensions in receiving societies. 
State Versus Ethnies
DISORDER AND PROMISE IN RESEARCH
The continuing chaotic state of general theories of collective violence still besets analyses. Thus, Rule's (1988) historical review of theories-rational choice, irrational collective outbreak, mass society, structural, resource-mobilization and others-fails to find central convergence, although particular models are deemed useful.
Accounting-for-variance studies are notoriously difficult, and those that wager all upon a single variable typically are inconclusive. Thus, Lichbach cites "diverse and contradictory" findings from some 40 studies that support every conceivable relationship between economic inequality and political conflict. This disconcerting circumstance has been variously attributed to problems of research design or statistical modeling and to deficiencies in fonnal models and theories. Eclectic work had failed to resolve the major puzzles. Remedies presumably must be sought in more rigorous studies that test crucial differences in predictions (Lichbach 1989).
Further, we must acknowledge that satisfying explanations of collective conflict cannot be confined to multivariate "accounting" in which a cluster of conditions are shown to precede or accompany the outcome of interest. Timing and sequence must be analyzed as well-"system-level outcomes depend not only on the configuration of actors, motives, and resources but also crucially on the sequence in which action occurs..." (Sewell 1987 Space limits foreclose a discussion of strategies for managing such conflicts. Considerable knowledge does exist.
CONCLUSION
The difficulties of research in this field are well-known. The phenomena of central interest-ethnicity, states, conflict-are of stunning complexity, requiring both disaggregation and multivariate analysis. The available data typically are cross-sectional, whereas repeated observations over time are needed for the dynamic analyses that could begin to disentangle causal sequences. Data often are crude and of uncertain validity, e.g. many conflicts go unreported and accounts may be incomplete and distorted. Information on microprocesses is scarce. Sequential-narrative analysis is in an early state of development. As we have just seen, a profusion of concepts, models and dominant-factor theories hinder a coherent research strategy and impede the organization of cumulative knowledge.
None of these difficulties is insurmountable. Indeed, the work here reviewed has produced much new substantive knowledge and conceptual clarification.
In spite of numerous controversies and confusing empirical findings, the same basic conditions for ethnic conflict repeatedly are identified in the works here reviewed. Most important are: (i) strong ethnic identities/boundaries; (ii) grievances; (iii) opportunity structures; (iv) resource mobilization.
An implication is that, at the very least, any research that seeks valid explanations should attend to all these simultaneously. Future studies should carefully specify the type of conflict that is in question-whether nonviolent protest, riots, pogroms, mutinies, coups d'etat, communal violence, low-intensity conflict (sabotage, kidnapping, assassinations, bombings, extortion), major armed combat. Type of ethny and extent and kind of grievances must be similarly identified. Linking the configurations of structural conditions to processes of mobilization and counter mobilization will open new possibilities for understanding some of the most intractable and tragic conflicts of our times. tions in the modem West. See Montville 
